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Abstract With ubiquitous use of digital camera devices, especially in mobile phones, pri-
vacy is no longer threatened by governments and companies only. The new
technology creates a new threat by ordinary people, who now have the means to
take and distribute pictures of one’s face at no risk and little cost in any situation
in public and private spaces. Fast distribution via web based photo albums, on-
line communities and web pages expose an individual’s private life to the public
in unpreceeded ways. Social and legal measures are increasingly taken to deal
with this problem. In practice however, they lack efﬁciency, as they are hard to
enforce in practice. In this paper, we discuss a supportive infrastructure aim-
ing for the distribution channel; as soon as the picture is publicly available, the
exposed individual has a chance to ﬁnd it and take proper action.
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Introduction
Until the 1990s, public distribution of images could only happen in the
press, either in print or in electronic broadcast media. To challenge the unau-
thorized distribution of an individual’s image, a media company could be iden-
tiﬁed and contacted. Furthermore, the media company usually would know
who the photographer was.
With the advent of the Internet as a public communication platform, fast and
global distribution ofimages inpublic withWebpages became common. Scanned
photos then were available from a unknown number of private web pages. The
availability of digital cameras reduced the cost and shortened the time it took2
to put images online. Still, pointing a digital camera at a person will be noticed
in many situations.
The early 21
￿
￿ century introduced mobile phones including digital cameras.
The camera lens can hardly be recognized, and now everyone who holds a mo-
bile phone in an individual’s surroundings could be taking a photo the same
time. Now the individual doesn’t know whether there are images on the Web,
the individual won’t see a camera while being photographed or ﬁlmed either.
This paper deals with the challenge of protecting one’s own image and private
issues attached to it. With respect to new mobile technologies and distribu-
tion channels, we sketch a privacy threat posed by millions of privately owned
cameras in mobile phones.
The legal situation is reviewed, and traditional law as well as recent efforts to
tackle the issue with new laws or technological solutions is reviewed.
Next is the deﬁnition of the threat, where the attacker and attack scenarios are
deﬁned. We introduce a protocol based on watermarking and broadcast chan-
nels to enable individuals to take notice when photos are produced around them
and search for them on the Web.
Finally, we discuss our solution for PRM and draw conclusions towards the
feasibility of the technology on mobile phones with particular respect to al-
ready existing digital rights management (DRM) technologies.
Table 1 forecasts sales of camera phones to be over 70 million pieces in 2006.
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Embedded camera phones 1.7% 9% 21% 45% 66%
Camera accessories 0.8% 5.0% 3.0% 2.0% 1.5%
Total mobile camera-capable
terminal sales to end users
(Thousand number of units)
2,626 14,770 24,657 48,159 70,036
Camera-capable mobile terminal shipments to end users by camera type-
Western Europe 2002-2006 (Percentage of total mobile terminal market)
Source: Gartner Dataquest (April 2003)
With massive numbers of camera phones out in the public, photos can be
taken at any place. News stories about offenders being caught while shooting
photos under women’s dresses in public are available from the United States,
Japan, Great Britain, Malaysia or even Saudi Arabia. Web sites like Voyeur-
web.com have been around longer than camera phones exist to even commer-
cially distribute the content. While this intrusive and offensive use of cameras
is regarded illegal in many places in the world, other uses seem to create ben-
eﬁts for society – other news stories tell of offenders being identiﬁed thanks to
camera phone photos taken by by-standers of a crime. Also, the story of Dutch
soccer champion Kluivert tells of new uses of public camera infrastructures.Personal Rights Management (PRM) 3
He broke his team’s curfew the night before a game, and was photographed
by numerous visitors of a night club – which in the end led to Kluivert being
expelled from the team (see Barker, 2003)
Considering the favourable uses of camera phones in public, a solution that
does detect, but not prevent taking of photos in public places may seem appro-
priate.
Technologies for mobile media production and distribution
Today, GPRS and other data transmission technologies for mobile phones
allow fast distribution of media content. Build-in software for the creation of
web based photo albums (Nokia, Fuji, Kodak online photo albums) and MMS
phone-to-phone distribution (Nokia Superdistribution, OMA DRM) offers im-
age distribution opportunities even to camera users who are not familiar with
internet data transfer protocols and Web page editing.
Examples of legal context
Several countries enacted laws against unauthorized taking of photos with
individuals. More countries are debating legislation that is intended to ban
camera phones or their use. Some examples are given below.
In Germany, a copyright law (“Kunsturhebergesetz”) protects one’s own
image against unauthorized publication since Bismarks’s times. Photos can
legally be taken without authorization, but their distribution without authoriza-
tion –even tosmallaudiences –isillegal. Exceptions arephotos taken inpublic
places at events where (press) photography usually happens. Also, individuals
of “public interest” (e.g. politicians, actors, celebrities) can be photographed
and published with limited restriction (see Dix, 2000).
In Australia, under the Commonwealth Crimes Act 1914 - Part VIIB, Sec-
tion 85ZE it is an offence for “a person to knowingly or recklessly use a
telecommunications service supplied by a carrier in such a way as would be
regarded by reasonable persons being , in all the circumstances, offensive”.
In addition, following the widespread introduction of the internet, state laws
were changed to address this issue. For example the Crimes Act in Victoria
was amended in 1995 to include the offence of ‘Stalking’. This includes tele-
phoning and sending electronic messages withthe intention ofcausing physical
or mental harm.
In Hungary, “Taking and transmitting recordings without legal or personal
accord is unlawful data handling and can lead to civil, or in some cases penal,
responsibility”, according to the Hungarian data protection ombudsman Attila
Peterfalvi in an 2003 Reuters’ article.4
Within the United States, many state laws, county and city legislation has
been enacted to ban the use of camera phones in public places or in certain
situations. The laws ban the use of a camera in a particular location.
InJapan,offenders –ifcaught –face ﬁnesof6months inprison or= Y500.000.
While many countries do have legislation about camera based privacy in-
vasions and the distribution of photos without consent of the photographed
individuals, the question of the enforcement remains. The next section reviews
current legal and technological efforts.
Current Solutions
The problem of secret photography has been recognized by most of the in-
volved parties, including the manufacturers, politics and private citizens. Some
measures have been taken, though with limited effect.
Tougher laws
As mentioned above, many countries have fortiﬁed the right on personal pic-
tures, and increased the punishment for the publication of such.
However, this right may be hard to enforce; the photographed individual may
never ﬁnd out about the publication, or at a time where the picture is too
widespread to do anything about it. Also, an offender has to be caught on the
scene, before the phone digitally transmits the photo away. Even with laws
enacted, an individual’s only choice would be to arrest the offender instead of
waiting for the police to show up. This is not a setting that helps all members
of a society with their rights.
Ban phones
One approach is that places especially subjected to illegal photographing - such
as public swimming pools, gyms and Saunas - ban the use of cameraphones
altogether. Also, many companies have banned cameraphones to counter in-
dustrial Espionage, among them DaimlerChrysler. This has lead to the situa-
tion that even some cellphone producers banned their own devices from their
premises, e.g. Samsung and Motorola.
Thisapproach may bea majorinhabitance for normal phone users (though ban-
ning cellphones altogether in some places is not a bad idea in the ﬁrst place),
and is only suitable for controlled areas with a high risk of secret photograph-
ing. Also, the ban has to be enforced somehow, which may not be easy con-
cerning the small size of camera phones.
“Shutter”- noise
Currently, the most common solution to the problem of secret photographing
is to add a sufﬁcient loud shutter-noise – whenever a picture is taken, this can
be noticed by the environment. This approach has several disadvantages:Personal Rights Management (PRM) 5
It is often poorly implemented. For example, if a Sony Ericsson T610 is
switched into silent mode, this also turns off the shutter noise.
Given the noise pollution created by cellphones anyhow, this can add to
the annoyance of the technology - especially if MMS trafﬁc (and thus
the use of phone-cameras) increases the way the industry hopes
It violates the privacy of the photographer, as everybody, including peo-
ple not on the picture altogether, immediately learn about him being
present with a camera.
It is mostly ineffective. Not only can the noise get overheard (due to
general noise or the environment, e.g. in a Discotheque), it usually does
not help the victim. She can shout at the photographer, but in the average
situation she will hardly be able to do anything effective.
Given the difﬁculty to prevent pictures from being taken without dramati-
cally infringing the rights of harmless photographers, our approach targets the
distribution channel rather than the creation of the picture. Thus, pictures can
be taken without restrictions. However, the subject of the pictures is made
aware that some picture has been taken. Furthermore, should the picture ap-
pear on the Internet, she has a realistic chance to locate it at an early point in
time, when it is still possible to inhibit the distribution by legal means.
As an added value, outside of protecting the victims privacy, this technology
can also be used to distribute pictures to interested parties.
Enforce Safe Zones by broadcast
Several businesses develop so-called safe harbor technology which is intended
to create zones where a broadcast unit tells camera phones that photographing
is forbidden there. Two british companies called Sensaura and Iceberg Sys-
tems advertise such a technology: Safe Haven allows the camera functionality
of the phone or other electronic devices to be disabled without affecting any
other usage of the device. Safe Haven works by transmitting a signal in a lo-
calised environment such as a school, swimming pool, ofﬁce facility or factory,
which disables the camera functionality of devices in the nearby environment.
Safe Haven enables digital cameras within a variety of electronic devices to be
disabled including camera phones, camera PDA’s, digital cameras and multi-
purpose MP3 players. (www.sensaura.com, Press Release of Sep 11, 2003)
While this approach empowers property owners to deﬁne zones where photo
taking is not permitted, it also restricts a user’s freedom of taking pictures with
consent in the area.
Other problems are the camera phones already sold to the market and the need
to implement the revceiver technology into all manufacturer’s handsets for an
effect. Furthermore, to protect individual rights, one needs a portable unit.6
This only could guarantee personal rights independent from someone’s prop-
erty protection policy.
The Privacy Tradeoff
In protecting the personal rights of the person involved in our setting, we
have to make a tradeoff between two parties, the person being photographed
(the individual) and the photographer. We will now state the minimum rights
of each party that should be preserved.
Ideally, the individual should have the right to give consent to every picture she
plays a major role in; this is the actual right granted by law in the European
Union. This right is hard to enforce technologically, however, as it includes
judgment on when a picture is a picture of a person, or just a picture of a mar-
ketplace that happens to have people on it.
Asaminimum, the individual has the right to knowshe has been photographed,
and to have a chance to get an early warning if the picture is being published,
allowing her to take appropriate steps in needed.
As long as he does not infringe any personal rights, the photographer should
have the right to take pictures without any major obstacles. In this, the protocol
should preferably be passive, and not prevent him from taking pictures unless
under well deﬁned and measurable circumstances. Furthermore, the photogra-
pher has the right to stay anonymous (as long as he does not infringe anybody
else’s rights).
Finally, the photographer has the right to modify his device; for example, the
camera in a PDA should not stop working if the operating system is modiﬁed
or replaced.
An Infrastructure for Personal Rights Management
Attack Model
We assume that the attacker does not want to spend much resources into
breaking the device. Even with a perfect scheme, such an attacker could easily
circumvent our entire system by using a traditional camera with a strong zoom
optics, or a traditional mini-camera. Thus, protecting against such an adversary
is pointless – the problem is not in the professional voyeurs, but in the wide
deployment of photographic devices and the ease of secret photographing.
We do assume, however, that the attacker can do simple modiﬁcations to the
device and the picture, and that the corresponding instructions will eventually
be published on the Internet. At the moment, for example, there exist Internet
sources that offer modiﬁed operating systems for cellphones to turn off the
noise generated while taking a picture.Personal Rights Management (PRM) 7
Our protocol leaves a number of attack points where a sufﬁciently motivated
attacker can escape the scheme. This is unavoidable if we want to protect the
rights of harmless photographers as well – unless we treat every owner of a
cellphone like a criminal, there will always be ways to escape the scheme.
Outside of making this somewhat harder and therefore less attractive to
the masses, our protocol also has its merits if combined with legal measures.
Though circumventing the protocol may be possible, it does demonstrate that
the photographer has “criminal intend”. Thus, it is easier to distinguish a nor-
mally harmless person that just couldn’t resist taking a picture in a particular
situation from a semiprofessional voyeur with manipulated equipment.
Basic Protocol
Players
There are three major players in our setting.
The Photographer (Bob) is the person taking the pictures. Bob uses a
phonecam, i.e., a cellular phone with a build in camera. Bob has the rights
to not be inhibited while taking pictures and has his identity preserved as long
as he does not infringe anybodies rights. Also, Bob has the right to perform
“standard” changes to his cell phone, such as updating the operating system.
The Model (Alice) is the person that is photographed by the photographer.
Her interest is that she has control over pictures taken of her, i.e., if she is the
center of the picture, this picture should (ideally) not been takes without her
consent. In our protocol, we grant her a lesser right: If a picture taken of her is
published, she gets a fair chance to ﬁnd out early.
The individual uses a receiver, which registers the identities of pictures taken
in her vicinity. This could be her own cell phone, but also specialized hard-
ware. The receiver can also be in the infrastructure, i.e., it is provided by
external parties, e.g., the owner of a Discotheque or even the GSM operators
themselves.
Finally, the search engine searches the Internet for picture identities and
makes them publicly available. This service is not unlike normal Internet
Search engines, but with slightly modiﬁed rules.
The Protocol8
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In the ﬁrst step, Bob chooses to take a picture of unaware Alice. His camera
generates a random picture ID, broadcasts it and embedds it as a watermark
into the picture.
Alice’s receiver pics up the picture ID and stores it for later use.
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When Bob puts the picture on the Internet, specialised search engines ﬁnd it
and index it by the watermarked picture ID. Alice sends requests to the search
engine with all picture identities that her receiver picked up, and thus locates
the picture taken by Bob.
Hardware Implementation
For our protocol to work, we need to establish a connection between the
phonecam and the receiver. We assume that no cell phone manufacturer will be
willing to add completely new communication technology into the devices to
enable a protocol such as the one presented above. Thus, we restrict ourselves
to current hardware. This leaves three general ways to communicate between
devices:
Infrared
The big advantage of infrared communication in our setting is that it is di-
rected, i.e., the signal can be send in a way that only devices in the view of the
camera receive it. This comes with at some price. The bandwidth of infraredPersonal Rights Management (PRM) 9
communication is fairly low, and the distance over which a signal can be trans-
ported may be too small. Also, it causes problems on the receiving side: if the
receiver is not directed to the camera, it may not get any signal at all.
In the way infrared ports are implemented today, they are fairly easy to
block; it is sufﬁcient to glue an object onto the light. Also, jamming the signal
with a strong infrared light is fairly easy, which would block all communica-
tion.
The ﬁrst issue can easily be solved by building the receiver into the camera
lens. Thus, blocking the communication would disable the ability to take pic-
tures. The second approach is harder to deal with. It may possible to design
a camera that can not take pictures if exposed to a strong infrared signal, but
that may not solve the problem (as the jamming signal may be directed) and
allow for a denial of service attack, i.e., preventing all cellphone cameras to
take pictures at all (that possibility may be wanted though.
Bluetooth
This is essentially the complement of IR: The disadvantage is that a Bluetooth
signal is undirected, thus also devices not in the visual scope of the camera get
the signal. However, it is very difﬁcult to jam, and the bandwidth is sufﬁcient
even for interactive protocols.
An additional disadvantage is that currently, enabling Bluetooth on a phone
may pose a security risk. Recent studies show that many Bluetooth phones
are open to attacks that may reveal the entire phone memory, i.e., the ad-
dress book, the calendar etc. This may even be possible if the phone is not
discoverable – the mere activation of Bluetooth is sufﬁcient (see for example
http://www.nwfusion.com/news/2004/0211cracksappear.html)
Thus, unless the security of this technique can be improved, to protect the pri-
vacy of her pictures the individual may have to risk a privacy-invasion on her
phonebook.
GSM-Network
Finally, by their very nature cellphones are capable of sending and receiving
signals on the GSM frequencies.
Thus, the idea is tempting to use that signal to transmit the necessary informa-
tion. However, in the current speciﬁcation, the GSM protocol is ill-suited for
device-to device communication. Adding this capacity would require major
changes in the GSM standard, which is unlikely to happen for the purpose of
protecting people form illegal pictures.
It would be possible to use the basestation as an intermediate, i.e., the pho-
tographer’s device sends a signal to the basestation, which in turn sends a cell-
broadcast to all devices in the area.
This creates new problems. For one, one cell may be too big, noticing many
devices that don’t have anything to do with the picture altogether. Also, phones10
at the same location may be locked into another cell or use a different provider.
All of the above
Of course, on can also think of a combination of those techniques; for example,
an infrared ﬂash could be used to inform a device that it should now listen
to a Bluetooth signal or a GSM cellular broadcast. If implemented properly,
this could combine the advantages of all technologies: As the infrared signal
only has to carry a binary signal, the low bandwidth and limited range are not
problematic anymore. And as receivers that did not see the ﬂash do not listen
to the radio signals, they can be conﬁgured to not pick up pictures that don’t
interest them at all.
Attacks on the Hardware
It is to be expected that some users will try to disable the proposed function-
ality by manipulating their devices. There are three general approaches that
already are used to disable the “shutter noise” in current phones:
Implementation errors. Surprisingly many cellphones have implementation
errors that allow to circumvent the protective mechanism. For exam-
ple, some phones turn of the shutter noise if the entire phone is put in
silent mode. For our protocol, it is possible that the transmission may
be blocked by deactivating Bluetooth or by using it for communicating
with another device while the picture is taken. There is little one can
propose to counter the problem, and it is not even clear if these errors do
not occasionally happen by intent.
Manipulated Hardware. Someusers directly manipulate theircellphones hard-
ware, i.e., by building a on/off switch into the speaker. For our protocol,
the manipulation could detach the infrared light or the Bluetooth an-
tenna. These attacks require a certain amount of skill and essentially
always invalid the warranty, so they are unlikely to be used by an aver-
age attacker. If they are used, there is again little possibility for defense
on the software side.
Manipulated Firmware. ForsomeCellphones, manipulated ﬁrmwareisavail-
able on the Internet. This ﬁrmware then turns of the corresponding func-
tionality. This attack is easy to perform by a broad audience. Once the
manipulation has been done, essentially everybody is able to replace the
ﬁrmware. As the possibility for updates and alternative operating sys-
tems is a desired one, this problem will remain. However, cell phone
manufacturers have recently started to think about other functionalityPersonal Rights Management (PRM) 11
that a user may not manipulate, e.g., Nokias Superdistribution and Mi-
cropayment. Thus, it is foreseeable that this problem will be solved in
the near future, e.g. by using a core-operating system that cannot be
changed by the owner and building the real operating system on top of
this core, or by TCPA/TCG-like technologies.
Software Implementation
A key point of our scheme is to embed watermarks with a picture identity
into the pictures. An occasional collision between two picture identities does
not cause signiﬁcant trouble – it merely poses a minor annoyance to a user.
Thus, the picture identity does not need to be excessively long. With a k-bit
identiﬁer, we need 1.2v2
￿ pictures for the probability of a collision being
￿
￿.
With an expected 70 million devices sold by 2006, a 40 bit identiﬁer should
be sufﬁcient even for high usage of the cameras. Although there are no ﬁrm
numbers, a embedding a 40 bit watermark into a picture with 640*480 pixels is
quite realistic. Forexample, thewatermark benchmark byKutterand Petitcolas
Kuttern and Petitcolas, 1999 performs the tests with 100 bit watermarks on
512*512, 24 bit colored pictures.
One of the weaknesses of our scheme is that everybody has to be able to
extract the watermark information from the picture. This does not inhibit the
privacy of the photographer, as the information is a random string without any
meaning. However, it does assist the photographer in attacking the watermark,
as he can always verify if his modiﬁcations destroyed the information.
Limits of the technology Watermarking algorithms are the most critical
part in the suggested infrastructure. Watermarking has its failures – the manip-
ulation of digital images can damage or destroy watermarks if enough effort
is taken to do so. Some watermarking technologies are robust against strong
image operations such as re-scaling an image, others are not. Instead of focus-
ing on each watermarking algorithm’s individual failures, we suggest to review
the PRMsystem as a large-scale system like the media industry’s DRMefforts.
DRM is very likely to be broken or bypassed by skilled individuals, but a high
number of consumers lack the knowledge and energy to do so. PRM can be
viewed the same – it has the potential to help individuals to detect a high num-
ber of privacy violations except for a few skilled ones. The technology might
develop to improve watermarking, too.
Search engines The ﬁnal part of our protocol is a search engine that allows
the individual to locate the pictures on the Internet. Today, there are two major
distribution channels:
On the World Wide Web, the search engine could work just like ordinary
search engines today. All that is necessary is to extract the Watermark from the12
pictures and use it as an index. If the Watermark extraction is computationally
easy, this can be done within the normal operation of search engines. For copy-
right protection schemes, commercial web spiders are already available, such
asDigiMarcs MarcSpider (see www.digimarc.com/products/imagebridge/MarcSpider/default.asp).
Naturally, counter technologies have been developed that hide the pictures
from the spider, for example by splitting it into many small pictures or by
embedding it using Javascript. This is another point where a sufﬁciently mo-
tivated attacker can circumvent the scheme, which is hard to deal with unless
the privacy of the photographer is inhibited.
On Peer-To-Peer networks, searching is somewhat more difﬁcult. However,
even now, lists of checksums of various ﬁles on peer to peer networks exist,
e.g. www.sharereactor.com. A similar technology could be used to centrally
collect picture identities, and thus provide efﬁcient searching also on peer-to-
peer networks.
Modiﬁcations
Stronger Watermarking
To strengthen the watermarking, some technique could be used that allows
only selected parties (i.e., the search engines), to extract the watermark from
the picture. The advantage is that it would become more difﬁcult to attack the
scheme, as the photographer can not easily verify if the watermark has been
successfully removed. However, this would give selected parties the exclusive
power to use the scheme. This may be unwanted, and raises the question on
who selects these parties.
ID of photographer
To strengthen the protocol, the identity of the photographer or his cellphone
could be added to the transmitted signal and/or the watermark. This would
signiﬁcantly decrease the risk that the protocol is broken by the photogra-
pher, as the individual learns his identity no matter how and if the protocol
is distributed. However, this poses a massive privacy problem, as anonymous
photographing would become impossible. A possible solution is to encrypt
the identity using a randomized encryption scheme. In this case, the identity
would only be revealed if there is sufﬁcient evidence that the picture is illegal,
e.g., because it was taken inside a public sauna. Still, it remains an open ques-
tion who is allowed to decrypt the identities and how misuse on this side can
be prevented.
Digests instead of Watermarks
An alternative to embedding a watermark into the picture is to broadcast a
digest of the picture after it has been taken. This has the advantage that the
picture does not need to be modiﬁed at all. However, the digest has to be
resilient against picture transformations. To our knowledge, no technique ofPersonal Rights Management (PRM) 13
building a digest of a picture exists so far that would survive simple modiﬁ-
cations to the picture. Nontheless, for existing peer-to-peer trading systems,
hash values of ﬁles are used to index media data and reate its quality, e.g. at
www.sharereactor.com.
Broadcasting the Picture
In addition to the identifyer, a stronbgly compressed version of the picture
could be broadcasted as well. This would inform the individual if there is need
to take immediate action, e.g. because a specially compromising picture has
been taken or because a credit card has been photographed. On the other side,
this costs signiﬁcant bandwidth, and signiﬁcantly infringes the photographers
privacy.
Conclusion
In recent months, cameraphones have also been used in much more mali-
cious ways than „just“ to invade privacy. Several reports have been published
of cases where credit card information has been obtained by secretly taking a
picture of the card. With today’s cameras, a picture with sufﬁcient quality can
be taken from about one meter distance to the card.
Control over one’s image is hard to enforce today. Using cryptographic
technology and legal regulation in the way suggested above can improve an
individual’s ability to regain control over his image. As suggested by Alexan-
der Dix (see Dix, 2000), privacy ofﬁcers and data protection activists can draw
new possibilities of privacy management online from the exploitation of tech-
nology that has been developed for digital rights management.
Initiatives to enact laws that ban the taking of unauthorized photos are of lim-
ited effect when they lack a technological support that supports enforcement
and prosecution. On the other hand, users and consumers reject technology
that presses restrictions on them. Our suggestion of a detection system for pri-
vate photos being published on the Internet empowers individuals to detect and
act upon violations without putting strong restrictions on cameras and photog-
raphers.
In out opinion, great advance for individual privacy can be achieved by ap-
plying DRM technology for personal rights management. For DRM, in face of
its technological uncertainties, a market for watermarking photographs, videos
and music has already developed, as illustrated by the vendor DigiMarc. Photo
agencies and photographers rely on watermarking technology to counter un-
skilled attackers. The same approach is feasible for Personal Rights Manage-
ment.14
Future Work
Many new applications of PRM can be imagined. Researchers might en-
counter ﬁltering approaches where web hosting companies ensure legailty of
the images posted on their servers by using ﬁltering machanisms that prevent
publishing photographs with no watermarks.
A photographer could choose to put some form of identiﬁcation into a water-
mark to enable photo licence selling.
Electronic government applications such as trafﬁc control and ticketing might
beneﬁt from adding time and place information into the photos when they are
taken.
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